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Introduction to The Forty Acres Documents (First Edition) 
 
 
THE END OF CHATTEL SLAVERY 
 
 In the census of 1860, enslaved Afrikans in the U.S. 
numbered 3,953,760 out of which 97.1 percent lived and 
labored in the south. The small percentage of Blacks outside of 
the southern states were mostly in Missouri (114,931), but 29 
were in Utah, 18 in New Jersey, 15 in Nebraska, and two in 
Kansas. The states with the largest number of Blacks included 
Virginia, followed by Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, South 
Carolina, Louisiana, and North Carolina. As for free Blacks, 
this group numbered 488,070, with about 53 percent residing in 
the southern states. Close to three-fourths of the free Blacks 
living outside the south lived in Pennsylvania, New York, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Indiana. And with the white population at 
26,922,537, Africans were outnumbered sis to one (Negro 
Population in the United States, 44, 51, 55, 57) This basic 
demographic profile of the Civil War clearly marks the African 
population in the U.S. as a land-based organized people. 
  
To speak of these 4.4 million Blacks as a nation is a 
very difficult problem if the meaning of the term and the 
history of this group is properly valued. First, what is a nation? 
Imari Obadele, in his “Marco-Level Theory of Human 
Organization,” explains that a nation comes about” by people, 
over decades, being welded together by access to a common 
gene pool, and by a common history, viewed from the same 
perspective and being identified with a definite land mass” (A 
Brief History of Black Struggle in America, 8) Obadele 
emphasizes that nations are forms of identity and socialization 
that arise from the social structure, not mere forms of false 
consciousness which ruling classes use to divide and conquer 
the working class. By 1860, it may be argued that four million-
plus Afrikans had begun to evolve into a distinct nation inside 
the U.S. To further explore this very complex question the 
reader is encouraged to study the works cited at the end of this 
introduction, notably those by Dr. Obadele. 
 
 The chief idea advanced herein is that when the U.S. 
split apart in 1861, oppressed Blacks had national aspirations, 
or to use Obadele’s subtle and appropriate term, they had a 
national personality, but, the historical context was not then 
ripe for them to try to forge themselves a state and press for 
their full national sovereignty. “Revolution or national 
liberation struggle,” Amilcar Cabral states, “is like a dress 
which must be fit to each individual’s body” (Return to the 
Source, 77). As Blacks heard and saw the rumble of war, they 
were hopeful and cautiously evaluated whether this was the 
moment to strike for their freedom. Long years of oppression 
bred a conservatism in Black folk. Not a reactionary, “family 
values,” kind of conservatism, but a “watch your-back” and 
consider-all-aspects-of-a-situation demeanor. If ten times the 
number of white men had perished in the Civil War as did, 
perhaps then conditions would have suggested the possibility 
of launching an all out fight for a separate Black nation. This, 
however, was not the case, and freed people quickly assessed 
that survival “by any means necessary” was still the order of 
the day. Throughout the war years, their fight for freedom 
largely remained a matter of taking inches rather than ells or 
miles. 
 
 In contrast to Black southerners’ quiet accommodation 
of the plantation system for the three decades that followed Nat 
Turner’s insurrection, the actions of enslaved and free Blacks 
during the war seem bold and heroic. But measured against the 
distance they needed to travel to be truly free and independent, 
Blacks were just getting deep into the political-military mix 
when white southerners and northerners ended their war. 
History, however, is never written in the subjunctive mood. 
Black people did the best they could, given the circumstances, 
to realize their national aspirations of a separate land, where 
they would rule themselves for themselves. The testimony of 
Brother Henry Adams before the U.S. Senate speaks to this 
reality. He enlisted in the armed forces of the U.S.A. because 
of the way “our people had been treated…the way our people 
was [sic] opposed.” He was not concerned with the security of 
the United States nor was he worried about proving himself 
worthy of U.S. citizenship. Like many other Blacks who joined 
the army, Adams’ foremost interest was the condition of his 
people. His “colonization council” took as its first step the 
petitioning of President Ulysses Grant and Congress “to help 
us out of our distress, or protect us in our rights and 
privileges.” This was the age-old call to pharaoh to stop his 
oppression or else “let my people go.” Adams’ questioner had 
to ask: “You preferred to go off somewhere by yourselves?” 
Adams answered simply and clearly: “Yes.” But where would 
they go? 
 
 Adams and his comrades wanted freedom: “Our idea 
was then to ask them to set apart a territory in the United States 
for us, somewhere we could go and live with our families.” 
They did not wanted paper citizenship, the high ideas of the 
white founding fathers, nor any integration into a social order 
that would not accept, love, and deal with them on terms of 
equal rights and justice. They wanted a nation where they 
could be a part of a family of men and women, not social 
outcasts to be used and exploited for the betterment of another 
people’s condition. Adams was not specific in where his 
council felt such a territory should be located. One is tempted 
to think they had no ideas about where their colony should be 
and would have taken anywhere, even Alaska, Oklahoma, or 
Arizona. We cannot say what specifically Adams felt about 
where a separated territory for his people should have been set 
up. We do, however, know something about how freedpeople 
viewed the land and land ownership. Ira Berlin, Thavolia 
Glymph, Steven Miller, Joseph, Leslie Rowland, and Julie 
Saville explain in the introduction to Freedom: A documentary 
of Emancipation, 1861-1867 the distinctive way Black folks 
claimed land:    
 
 Not even those Yankees most sympathetic with 
aspiration of the former slaves viewed landownership precisely 
as they did. Land, ex-slaves and Northerners concurred, could 
provide subsistence and foster independence from former 
owners. But their agreement usually ended. Former slaves, like 
many of their contemporaries throughout the world, generally 
did not view land as property in the abstract or as a commodity 
whose worth was determined by the market. Instead, they 
valued it in proportion to labor expended and suffering 
endured. Given a choice, they preferred to own or occupy not 
just any plot of ground, but land where they and their forebears 
had invested so much blood and sweat. Land was a link to 
generations past and future and a foundation for family and 
community among the living. 
 Freedpeople, thus, could have claimed land across the 
Old South from East Texas and Louisiana eastward to Virginia. 
Did this mean they would have usurped the land native peoples 
of the area, like the Seminoles, Choctaw, Cherokee, Creek, and 
Chickasaw? It is unlikely they would have, since freedpeople 
did not fully subscribe to Northern concepts of absolute 
property. Instead, rights to particular tracts might bear little 
resemblance to the specifications of a deed. When left to their 
own devices, freedpeople often allowed for overlapping rights 
in any one property; conversely, an individual’s use rights 
might encompass several parcels, not necessarily contiguous. 
Nonetheless, under terms of the Yankee occupation, 
freedpeople desiring to obtain control over land to comply with 
the incongruous conventions of the Northerners (Freedom,59). 
 
 This point underscores another issue. How did 
freedpeople feel about the U.S. government confiscating the 
land of the former rebels and turning it over to them? To be 
sure, many Afrikans might have harbored a vengeful spirit, but 
ultimately their analysis of the situation was more politically 
sophisticated and again, more cautious. How would they, a 
numerical minority (in the U.S. as a whole) without seed and 
plow of their own to work the land, defend their land against a 
hostile white mass? Without the presence and support of the 
U.S. military they would be defenseless. This was shaky 
ground on which to build a Black nation-state, unless there was 
significant international backing, as for example, was the case 
for Isreal after 1948. Today’s Israelis gained their 
independence, expropriated Palestinian land, and defended 
themselves against their Arab neighbors only through massive 
foreign assistance (and reparations!) from the U.S. and Europe. 
Conversely, Afrikans at the middle of the nineteenth century 
had no powerful allies to help win the independence of their 
nation and confiscate the land of their ex-slaveholding, 
confederate enemy. For the sake of survival, an 
accommodation had to be made. Through the Civil War Blacks 
ended chattel slavery, but they did not fully free themselves. 
 
Without Land, “What’s de use of being free?” 
 
 Black reparations and the national aspirations of 
Afrikans in the U.S. were trapped in a crucible of race, political 
economy, and other social and cultural forces. John Boles, the 
author of Black Southerners, 1619-1860 (1994), explicates 
many of the complexities of the American crucible and 
synthesizes much of the relevant historical literature on the 
Black experience into a compelling narrative. On the Civil War 
and Reconstruction period, however, his discussion is uneven. 
For instance, he points out “the [B]lacks withdrew from their 
old churches; they were not initially excluded. Many whites 
tried to persuade the freedmen not to separate, both because 
whites feared losing still more control over them” and because 
they did not think Blacks were capable of proper Christian 
worshipping on their own. “But freedmen,” writes Boles, “had 
chafed under white control – even well-intentioned white 
Paternalism – for too long. Black faith was strong, Black 
leaders were able, and the Black need for self-direction and 
autonomy was manifest. Consequently southern churches 
became significantly more segregated after the Civil War, and 
the move away from joint worship was instigated by Blacks 
though separation was later applauded by whites” (Black 
Southerners, 202). Here, Boles is somewhat on target. He 
debunks older works that stressed how “happy darkies,” the 
south’s, “faithful retainers” were want to stay close to their 
beloved white folks. 
 
 On the question of what it would have meant if 
freedpeople in masse had gotten land, Boles is pessimistic and 
thoroughly reductive: “The wrenching economic conditions in 
the Postwar South were so severe that land ownership would 
probably not have made a substantial difference in the long run 
unless Blacks had opted for a peasant like existence outside the 
market-crop economy, (Black Southerners, 203). Whitelaw 
Reid, during his tour of the south, noted Black’s desire for land 
in the moment of one elder: “What’s de use of being free if you 
don’t own land enough to be buried in? Might juss as well stay 
slave all yo, days” (After the War, 564). He and many other 
emancipated Afrikans knew better than Boles the difference 
landownership could make in their lives in both the short-and 
long-run. Their white contemporaries must have also had some 
reason for their reluctance- and sometimes their adamant 
refusal to allow Blacks to become more of a landowning class. 
Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch in One Kind of Freedom: 
The Economic Consequences of Emancipation make the 
case (along with other historians like Jonathan Wiener, Roger 
Shugg, Robert Higgs, and Jay Mandle) that the major 
difference in a pre- and post-emancipation plantation was the 
elimination of gang labor, not the concentration of control in a 
small elite of white landowners. The “planter elite,” Ransom 
and Sutch contend, “preserved intact the social and political 
hegemony of the antebellum era. The reason, of course, that 
emancipation and the demise of the plantation did not destroy 
the planter class was that they retained firm control over the 
primary form o  productive capital in the southern economy. 
Indeed, the only way the dominance of the planter class might 
have been ended would have been through a sweeping 
redistribution of land to the freedmen at the time of their 
emancipation” (One Kind (Freedom, 80).  
 
 Whether Blacks would have been a national minority of 
peasant cultivators if true agrarian reform had been carried out 
is impossible to determine. Too many economic and political 
variables would have to be held constant to make any statement 
at all. Even educated guesses must rely on a set of reasonable 
assumptions. What we do know is that freedpeople wanted land 
(which many felt was their due for the years of white coercion 
and theft of their labor power); they wanted that land in the 
very southern areas where they toiled, and, if protected from 
white predations and interference in their affairs, they would 
have been better off on their own land in comparison to 
sharecropping. 
 
 The federal government’s “experiments” in land reform 
furnish case studies of freedpeople on their own land. From the 
early days of the war, especially off the coast of South Carolina 
and Georgia, and across the south, attempts were made to settle 
Blacks on abandoned or confiscated land. The U.S. army 
attracted thousands of Black refugees to their camps. These 
Blacks were ignominiously referred to as “contrabands”. Many 
of these self-emancipated Blacks were returned to their former 
slaveholders as a rule. “Honest Abe” Lincoln gave his word in 
his inaugural address on March 4, 1861: “I have no purpose, 
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery 
in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to 
do so, and I have no inclination to do so” (The Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln, hereafter CWAL, Vol. IV; 263). 
Military necessity and political wrangling in his party would 
change Lincoln’ posture over time. 
 
 Some of the federal actions that concerned enslaved 
Blacks the most included: 1) Congress passed the Confiscation 
Act (August 6, 1861) warning slaveowners that they would 
lose their claim to the labor of any Blacks “employed in hostile 
service against the government” of the United States; 2) 
Lincoln ordered John C. Fremont (September 11, 1861 to 
modify his proclamation of August 30, in which he extended 
freedom to all Blacks enslaved by persons resisting the Union; 
3) Secretary of War Simon Cameron gave limited authorization 
to General Thomas W. Sherman to “employ fugitive slaves in 
such (non-military) services as they may be fitted for” (October 
1861) On November 7, 1861, the Yankee invasion of Port 
Royal Sound, a strategic position between Charleston, SC, and 
Savannah, GA, commenced one of the first wartime examples 
of virtual self-ruled by a community of persons who had been 
held as slaves; 5) March – April 1862, Lincoln signed an act 
ending the use of the army to return Black refugees to their 
“slaveowners,” approved a gradual emancipation plan 
compensating loyal slaveholders for each Afrikan they 
emancipated, and abolished slaver in Washington, D.C. 6) May 
19, 1962, Lincoln issued a proclamation revoking General 
David Hunter’s May 9, order which declared persons 
“heretofore held as slaves” in Georgia, Florida, and South 
Carolina “forever free” (CWAL) Vol. V, 222), and he also 
disbanded Hunter’s First South Carolina Regiment which was 
composed of Black troops; 7) June 19, 1862, Lincoln signed a 
measure outlawing slavery in the territories; 8) July 17, 1862, 
Congress passed a second Confiscation Art and the Enlistment 
Act which set up a discriminatory wage scale for Black and 
white Soldiers; 9) Autumn, 1862, Lincoln served notice (in his 
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation)  that he would 
emancipate all persons held in bondage in those states at war 
with the U.S. government; he also gave Blacks permission to 
enlist in the army to a limited extent; 10) Lincoln signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863, declaring that 
“all persons held as slaves” within any rebellious state” are, 
and henceforward shall be free: and that the Executive 
government of the United States, including the military and 
naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the 
freedom of said persons” (CWAL, Vol VI, 30-31). 
 
 These developments reveal the up and down, exigency-
driven path along which the federal government came to 
oppose the institution of slavery. By the war’s end the central 
issue for the U.S. government was “what to do with the negro?’ 
Black troops, dramatically increasing their numbers after the 
Emancipation Proclamation, effected a fundamental alteration 
in the meaning of the sectional struggle. Participating in nearly 
every aspect of military service, 178,895 persons of Afrikan 
descent became Union soldiers, most of whom were southern-
bred. With a 40 percent greater chance of being killed than 
white soldiers, Black troops fought courageously. Upwards of 
38,000 Blacks gave their lives in the great cause of ending 
slavery (Black Southerners, 214). 
 
 In the final year of the war, the U.S. government took 
its boldest initiatives on behalf of Black freedom and 
independence. Lincoln died toying with schemes to relocate the 
freedpeople outside of the U.S. – he had aborted his Chiriqui 
Plan to move Blacks to Panama after encountering opposition 
from several Latin American countries, but he then placed his 
hopes on appeasing northern whites with a pilot project to 
resettle 5,000 Black volunteers on Haiti’s Isle of Vach (With 
Malice Toward None, 338-9, 359). Meanwhile, General W.T. 
Sherman issued his Special Field Order No. 15 (January 16, 
1865) which offered military assistance to freedpeople who 
wanted land to “establish a peaceful agricultural settlement.” 
Lincoln made no move to countermand this order. Indeed, 
Lincoln was probably beginning to see that removal programs 
were not the answer. Blacks were in the south and there to stay. 
On March 3, 1865, Congress approved the original Freedman’s 
Bureau Act (see document below) he articulated the dominant 
white viewpoint that exists to the present: “A system for the 
support of indent persons in the United States was never 
contemplated by the authors of the Constitution: nor can any 
good reason be advanced why… it should be founded for one 
class or color of our people more than another.” This is the 
white man’s brain damage or historical amnesia at work. For 
them, a decade of unrequited toil is not a good enough reason 
why Black folks should get any reparations. The federal 
government has never given poor whites “who are honestly 
toiling from day to day for their subsistence” any land, schools, 
or hospitals, so why should poor Black folks get a break? 
Johnson’s words should be studied in every history classroom 
in this country. Students should discuss and vigorously critique 
the assumptions that undergird his veto message of February 
19, 1866. 
 
 The last effort at land reform was the Southern 
Homestead Act, passed on June 21, 1866. It reserved for 
freedpeople and loyal refugees nearly 45 million acres of 
publicly owned land in Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Alabama, and Florida. Qualified persons could obtain a parcel 
free of charge and had five years to work the land before 
having to pay a $5.00 fee. Although this was enough to grant 
every Black family forty acres, few ever became homesteaders 
under the measure. Not many freedpeople had the wherewithal 
to relocate, feed, clothe, and shelter themselves, purchase seed, 
tools, draft animals, and other supplies, while waiting for the 
first fruits of the harvest. Black soldiers who mustered out with 
a little capital and took advantage of the act received land of 
very poor quality for farming. This policy then, like the others, 
was a dismal failure (Shugg, 262) 
 
 The reasons for the government’s tragic betrayal of the 
freedpeople are diverse and complex. Part of the explanation 
lies in the inadequacy of their allies in Washington, D.C. 
Thaddeus Stevens, the Pennsylvanian senator who made 
famous the call for each person formerly held as a slave to 
receive forty acres and a mule (namely, in September 6, 1865, 
speech in Lancaster, PA), showed some concern for Blacks, but 
was driven by a relentless desire to punish the south. 
 
 On biographer, Fawn Brodie, who dubbed Stevens a 
“Puritan tyrant” and the “scourge of the South,” contends he 
might have done more good for Blacks had he put less 
emphasis on confiscation southern lands and concentrated his 
political capital on federal appropriation for them (Thaddeus 
Stevens, 231-33, 238, 303-06). Regarding General Oliver Otis 
Howard, another important white figure in the postwar era, one 
historian concluded “that much of the work of General Howard 
in the Freedmen’s Bureau served to preclude rather than 
promote Negro freedom” (Yankee Stepfather, 5). Andrew 
Johnson, who became president after Lincoln was assassinated 
on April 15, 1868, was a southern-born “poor white trash” 
turned pro-planter class after the war (Thaddeus Stevens, 217-
33). Others in the Republican party made efforts, but none of 
these men had the interests of Blacks uppermost on the 
political agenda. Outside the government as well as in, whites 
sincerely moved by the plight of the freedpeople were caught 
in a tangle of regional feelings, racial beliefs, gender issues, 
religious motives, clan ideas, and other factors that mediated 
their position and that of the “black other.” Few whites found it 
possible to break through the barriers of time, place, and 
condition, to put themselves in the shoes of Black folk and do 
unto them as they should have wanted done unto themselves. 
The empathy just was not there. 
 
 Overwhelmed and outnumbered, Blacks could not pull 
together and liberate themselves any further than they had by 
the end of the 1860s. Lacking dependable allies, their fight 
shifted to a defensive posture, one of merely safeguarding the 
basic human rights and freedoms for which they shed blood. 
The vision of a land they could call their own and be free, 
where they could live in peace away from their open enemies, 
most Blacks had relegated to prayer, to song, to folklore, 
uncertainly passed on the their children. The heroic work of 
Tunis Campbell, Henry Adams and his Committee, Edwin 
McCabe, the exodusters, Chief Alfred Sam, and other 
movements up to the Honorable Marcus Garvey and the UNIA, 
these movements would periodically reveal that the vision of 
independent land had organizational potency. The spirit of a 
collective Black independence would remain a part of the souls 
of Black folk, however, primarily in a hidden, masked, locked 
away, vernacularized, and repressed form. That spirit, that 
“movin’ thing” called Black self-love, self-respect, self-
determination, would travel in the whirlwind and surface, from 
time to tome with greater or lesser intensity. But always the 
spirit of independence was carried on. 
 
 Struck by their heroism on the field of battle, many 
modern historians lament the fact that the freedpeople were not 
treated fairly and were insufficiently supported in their desire 
to be free and to elevate their condition in the postwar period. 
But lamentations are not what is needed most from 
professional students of history. People, Black and otherwise, 
need to be better informed about the upkept promises the U.S. 
government made to the freedpeople. Like the trail of broken 
treaties between the U.S. government and the native Red 
nations, the Black nation, too, has been stunted in its 
development and kept unfree by the political and economic 
elite that rule this country as well as by the long-ingrained, 
emotional commitment to ignorance that infects the masses of 
white Americans. If the U.S. government someday must face 
judgment before world opinion for its crimes against 
indigenous people and nations inside its blood-marked borders, 
It must also pay for its crimes against people of Afrikan 
descent. As the House Bill on Black reparations, H.R. 40, 
observe: “Sufficient inquiry has not been made into the effects 
of the institution of slavery on living African Americans and 
society in the United States” (Reparations Yes!, 1993,94). It is 
hoped that the present volume will stimulate further 
investigation into the problem of slavery and the forgotten 
solution of land reparations. 
 
Amilcar Shabazz, June 1994 
Honors Instructor of History, Prairie View 
A&M University 
 
  
